The Anglican Triad

In an article in last month’s Nevertheless, I referred to Anglican theologian Richard Hooker’s order of priority that he assigned to Scripture, Reason, and Tradition. I didn’t include it in the article, but to be absolutely specific, I was drawing upon a quote from the Fifth Book of Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Chapter 8 "The Third Proposition," section 2. I think it has something still to teach us. (All the following quotations are from the 1977 edition from the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.)

In this section, Hooker refers to two kinds of laws that he believes the Church may properly establish: one for the sake of order, the other pertaining to doctrine. He does contend that “that which in doctrine the Church doth now deliver rightlie as a truth, no man will saie that it may hereafter recall and as rightlie avoutch the contrarie. Lawes touchinge matter of order are changeable, by the power of the Church; articles concerninge doctrine not so." Yet, he then says, in the specific quote to which I referred earlier, "Be it in matter of the one kinde or of the other, what scripture doth plainelie deliver, to that the first place both of creditt and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can neccessarelie conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth. That which the Church by her ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true or good, must in congruitie of reason overrule all other inferior judgmentes whatsoever." Here the casual reader will want to note that ‘succeedeth’ refers to ‘follows in order of succession’ rather than to ‘wins’ or ‘prevails.’


I find it interesting that Hooker includes congruity of reason in the mix. It seems to me that either he is saying that it is a congruent and reasonable conclusion to draw to the Church's judgments inherently have power to overrule other judgments; or he is saying that the overruling power of the Church's judgment must be congruent with sound reasoning. The former reading of it would have Hooker plainly contradicting his preceding statement; while the latter interpretation would show a consistent argument. I think we may rightly surmise that Hooker believes the Church’s ecclesiastical authority should be congruent with, and thus accountable to, reason.

In his conclusion to this chapter, Hooker provides one more hint as to his meaning. We need to remember that his intention is to suggest that the Church of England is seeks a balance polity that will redress the 'evells" of an overly authoritarian Church along with those a Church from which "too much is derogated," i.e. an overbearing Church and an impotent Church. Thus, he concludes his proposition, "Wee therefore crave thirdlie to have it granted, that where neither the evidence of anie laws divine, nor the streingth of anie invincible argument otherwise found out by the light reason, nor anie notable publique inconvenience doth make against that which our own lawes ecclesiasticall have although but newlie instituted, for the orderinge of these affaires, the verie authoritie of the Church it selfe, at the least in such cases, maie give so much credit to her own lawes, as to make theire sentence touchinge fittnes and conveniencie waightier then anie bare and naked concept to the contrarie; especiallie in them who can owe no less then childlike obedience; to hir that hath more then motherlie power."

Reading this through carefully, I think we see that Hooker, while seeking to claim and preserve the power of the Church to set polity concerning both order and doctrine, does subject the Church's law-making power to a criteria of critical review: evidence of divine law, and invincible argument found by the light of reason. Hooker is consistent here. He maintains here the order of priority that he described earlier, in that he sees the voice of the Church as an authority that, without the affirmation of divine law (presumably accessed through Scripture), and/or the light of reason, has its power solely in the strength of tradition. As such, as an authoritative resource for the establishment of laws of polity, the voice of the Church, expressed in its Tradition, follows in reverse order behind the authority of Reason and the authority of Scripture.

Offering this sketchy and imperfect review, I suggest that as we muddle through our current controversy, we as Anglicans will do well to pay better attention than we have been in referencing the triad of the Anglican theological method. A great many are calling upon “Scripture and Tradition” to bolster their arguments, and referring to ”Reason” (if at all) rather as the third element to bring to bear only if the first two fail to show the way ahead. The truth of the matter is, if we truly wish to appeal to our Anglican heritage, we need to recognize that historically Reason has an esteemed and elevated place in the Anglican way, more-so than that of the much-beloved Tradition. To the degree that we can recognize this, I think we may be inspired towards better incorporation of Reason into our respective arguments, and so perhaps improve the quality and effectiveness of the current debate.

Jim +